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Abstract
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency framework where the agent exhibits task-specific
abilities. It illustrates how incentive contracts account for the agent’s task-specific abilities
if contractible performance measures do not reflect the agent’s contribution to firm value.
This paper further sheds light on potential ranking criteria for performance measures in
multi-task agencies. It demonstrates that the value of performance measures in multi-task
agencies cannot necessarily be compared by their respective signal/noise ratios as in single-
task agency relations. It is rather pivotal to take the induced effort distortion and measure-
cost efficiency into consideration – both determined by the agent’s task specific abilities.
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1 Introduction
Empirical investigations have offered an abundance of evidence suggesting that individuals are
highly responsive to monetary incentives (see e.g. Asch [1990], Paarsch and Shearer [1999] and
Lazear [2000a]). Nevertheless, the specific effects of reward schemes are somewhat ambiguous
when individuals are required to perform a collection of different tasks. In such situations, Kerr
[1975] cautioned against the consequences of a reward system that inefficiently overemphasizes
some tasks while underemphasizing others. An illustrative example cited by Kerr [1975] is the
difficult trade-off between research and teaching responsibilities encountered by faculties at
universities. Since teaching quality is harder to assess relative to research output, and prospec-
tive promotion decisions mainly hinge on research performance, it is a common phenomenon
for faculty members to focus on research at the expense of teaching.1 In general, inefficient
effort allocations occur when available performance measures do not reflect employees’ true
contribution to firm value [Feltham and Xie, 1994]. In this case, employees focus on less or
even non-valuable tasks, and disregarding more beneficial ones [Feltham and Xie, 1994].2
Previous multi-task agency literature such as Feltham and Xie [1994], Banker and Thevaran-
jan [2000], and Datar, Kulp, and Lambert [2001] focus on performance measure congruity and
its effects on the efficiency of incentive contracts, but absent from these studies is the possibility
that agents may perform some tasks more efficiently than others.3 Recent literature however,
emphasizes the role of acquiring human capital for specific tasks (see e.g. Lindbeck and Snower
[2000], Gibbons and Waldman [2006] and Gibbons and Waldman [2004]).4 Since individuals
differ substantially in their learning aptitudes, which inevitably lead to discrepancies in skills
and abilities [Gibbons and Waldman, 2006], it is reasonable to infer that different individuals
might perform different tasks with varying degrees of ease.5 For example, Sapienza and Gupta
1See Brickley and Zimmerman [2001] for an empirical study of this example.
2See as well the discussion in Gibbons [1998].
3Schnedler [2006] is an exception. However, his focus is different in the sense that he investigates the con-
sequences of different marginal effort costs on the relative value of incongruent performance measures for the
provision of incentives.
4For empirical evidence see Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström [1994].
5Maher, Ramanathan, and Peterson [1979] conceive the term ‘congruence of perception with preferences’ to
indicate the phenomenon that even if an individual possesses the correct perception of different tasks, there might
still be a preference on specific tasks.
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[1994] indicate in their study of principal-agent relations within venture capital-backed firms
that the frequency of venture capitalist (principal) - CEO (agent) interaction is partially depen-
dent on the CEOs’ venture experience. They provide evidence that CEOs with prior experiences
(i.e. greater proficiency) in start-up ventures would have a lesser tendency of consulting with
their venture capitalist.
In order to understand the nature of contracts in multi-task agency relations, it is essential
to investigate whether and how task-specific abilities influence the agent’s preferences for her
effort allocation and the optimal provision of incentives in response to these abilities. This paper
thus focuses on multi-task agencies in order to gain new insights into the provision of incentives
if performance measures are incongruent with the principal’s objective and the agent exhibits
different abilities for performing relevant tasks.
This paper investigates how incentive contracts respond to individual task-specific abilities
combined with incongruent performance measures. It further demonstrates how the value of
performances measures can be compared in multi-task agencies. The analysis indicates that
the signal/noise ratio—sufficient to rank performance measures in single-task agencies—can
only be applied if all available measures provide the same information about the agent’s relative
effort allocation. The proposed ranking criteria is in general contingent on the agent’s specific
abilities such that different agents may imply various orderings of performance measures.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I give an overview of the model and derive the
first-best contract in section 3. I provide in section 4 the second-best contract and focus on the
relation between performance measure congruity and effort distortion in section 5. In section
6, I investigate how performance measures can be ranked in multi-task agencies, in particular
when agents are characterized by task-specific abilities. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a single-period agency relationship between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse
agent. The principal owns an asset and requires the agent’s productive effort. Once employed,
the agent is in charge of performing n ≥ 2 tasks (multi-tasking). These tasks are tied together,
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i.e. the principal cannot split and allocate them to different agents.6 The agent implements an
effort vector e = (e1, ..., en)t, e ∈ E ⊆ Rn+, where ei is the agent’s effort allocated to task i.7
Effort is non-verifiable and all activities ei ∈ E are measured in the same unit.
To incorporate task-specific abilities for the agent, I adapt Lazear’s [2000b] approach for a
single-task agency model to this multi-task framework. In this sense, the abilities differ across
tasks and determine the absolute and marginal effort costs borne by the agent. Let Ψ be an n×n
matrix representing the agent’s task-specific abilities. The agent’s effort costs are contingent on
Ψ and take the form C(e) = etΨe/2, where Ψ is a diagonal n × n matrix defined by Ψ =
diag (ψ1, ..., ψn), ψi > 0, i = 1, .., n. A higher ability for performing task i is characterized by
a lower ψi, i = 1, ..., n, and vice versa.8
The agent’s preferences are represented by the negative exponential utility function
U(w, e) = − exp [−ρ (w − C(e))] , (1)
where ρ denotes the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion and w as the agent’s wage.
For parsimony, let w¯ = 0 be her reservation wage implying a reservation utility U¯ = −1.
By conducting effort e, the agent contributes to the principal’s non-verifiable gross payoff
V (e) = µte + εV , where εV is a normally distributed random component with zero mean
and variance σ2V , representing firm-specific and economy wide risk. The n-dimensional vector
µ = (µ1, ..., µn)
t, µi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n, characterizes the marginal effect of e on gross payoff
V (e). Since V (e) is non-verifiable, it cannot be part of an explicit single-period incentive
contract. The only verifiable information about e, however, is provided by the performance
measure
P (e) = ωte+ ε, (2)
where ω = (ω1, ..., ωn)t ∈ Rn+ is the vector of performance measure sensitivities. The random
component ε is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2, and represents potential
effects on the performance measure beyond the agent’s control.
6For considerations on how multiple tasks are efficiently split among several agents, refer e.g. to Holmström
and Milgrom [1991], Corts [2007], and Schöttner [2006].
7All used vectors are column vectors where ‘t’ denotes the transpose.
8A similar approach is used by MacLeod [1996], where ψi, i = 1, ..., n, are random variables. However, his
work is different in the sense that he focuses on the relationship between explicit and implicit incentive contracts
rather than on the effort distortion induced by incongruent performance measurement.
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As pointed out by Feltham and Xie [1994], the performance measure does not necessarily
capture the agent’s contribution to the gross payoff perfectly. Formally, if there exists a constant
λ 6= 0 satisfyingµ = λω, performance measure P (e) is congruent with the gross payoff V (e).9
Otherwise, the performance measure is incongruent and its application in an incentive contract
motivates the agent to implement an inefficient effort allocation across tasks [Feltham and Xie,
1994, Baker, 2002].
Baker [2002] provided a geometric measure for performance measure congruity. Since his
result is fundamental to the subsequent analysis, it is summarized in the following definition.
Definition 1. The congruence of performance measure P (e) to gross payoff V (e) with respect
to the marginal effect of e is measured by ΥC(ϕ) = cosϕ, where ϕ is the angle between the
vector of gross payoff sensitivities µ and the vector of performance measure sensitivities ω.
Accordingly, as long as vector µ and vector ω are linearly independent, the performance
measure does not reflect the agent’s contribution to gross payoff, and therefore, is incongruent.
Formally, there exists no constant λ 6= 0 satisfying µ = λω, thereby implying ϕ 6= 0. A
more congruent performance measure thereby implies a smaller angle ϕ and leads to a higher
measure of congruity ΥC(ϕ) due to the definition of the cosine. Finally note that ϕ ∈ [0, pi/2]
since µi, ωi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n, where ϕ is represented in radian measure.
In line with previous multi-task literature, I restrict my analysis to a compensation scheme
w which is linear in performance measure P (e). The payment w takes therefore the form
w(e) = α + βP (e), (3)
where α denotes the fixed payment and β denotes the incentive parameter. The transfer α is
utilized to split the surplus between the principal and the agent, whereas β is used to provide
the agent with incentives for implementing effort.
Since the compensation scheme is linear, the agent’s utility is exponential, and the error term
is normally distributed, maximizing the agent’s expected utility is analogous to maximizing her
9This phenomenon is described by several terms in the multi-task agency literature: performance measure
congruity [Feltham and Xie, 1994, Bushman, Indjejikian, and Penno, 2000, Hughes, Zhang, and Xie, 2005], non-
distorted performance measure [Baker, 2000, 2002], and goal congruence [Anthony and Govindarajan, 1995,
Banker and Thevaranjan, 2000]. For the sake of consistence, I use the term performance measure congruity
throughout this paper.
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certainty equivalent
CE(e) = α + βωte− 1
2
etΨe− ρ
2
β2σ2, (4)
where ρβ2σ2/2 is the required risk premium in order to compensate the agent for the uncertainty
in her incentive payment βP (e).
The timing of this problem is as follows. First, the principal offers the agent a contract
(α∗, β∗). If this contract guarantees the agent at least the same expected utility as her best
alternative, she accepts. After the agent implemented e and the random variables ε and εV are
realized, the payments take place.
For clarification, I subsequently illustrate the distinction between effort intensity and effort
allocation. Formally, let two arbitrary activities ek and ej vary to eˆk and eˆj , respectively. If
the ratio between both activities remains identical such that ek/ej = eˆk/eˆj , k, j = 1, ..., n,
k 6= j, the relative effort allocation remains the same. In contrast, if ek/ej 6= eˆk/eˆj for at
least one pair (k, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}, k 6= j, the relative effort allocation varies. The overall effort
intensity, however, changes without affecting the effort allocation, if there exists a constant
λ > 0 satisfying e = λeˆ, where eˆ is the modified effort vector.
For the ease of comparing different effort allocations, it is useful to commit to the subsequent
definition throughout this paper.
Definition 2. The agent implements a distorted effort allocation if there exists no constant λ 6= 0
satisfying µ = λe.
The implemented effort allocation is referred to be distorted if it does not reflect the agent’s
marginal contribution to gross payoff V (e). Note, however, that non-distortion is not necessar-
ily optimal since this concept does not incorporate the corresponding costs for implementing an
arbitrary effort vector.
3 The First-Best Contract
Before I move on to the second-best contract, it is useful to derive the first-best solution of
this problem as a benchmark for the subsequent analyzes. Then, the first-best effort allocation
and intensity can be compared to the second-best environment, where the agent’s effort is non-
contractible so that moral hazard occurs.
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Suppose the principal can specify a desired effort intensity and allocation in an enforceable
contract. In this case, she appoints the effort vector e which maximizes the difference between
the expected gross payoff V (e) and costs w = C(e):
max
e
Π(e) = µte− 1
2
etΨe. (5)
Let φ ≡ Ψ−1µ = (µ1/ψ1, ..., µn/ψn)t be the vector of the payoff-cost sensitivity ratios. Then,
the first-best effort vector is
efb = φ. (6)
The principal maximizes her expected profit by assigning each activity ei in accordance to its
payoff-cost sensitivity ratio µi/ψi, i = 1, ..., n. Activities with high ratios are consequently
more intensively conducted relative to activities with low ratios.
Recall that efb is distorted if there exists no constant λ 6= 0 satisfying µ = λefb, see defini-
tion 2. In contrast, if the agent has different abilities across tasks, it is optimal to implement a
distorted effort allocation in order to balance the benefits and costs of all relevant tasks.
By substituting efb in (5) and using the relation µtφ = ‖µ‖‖φ‖ cosκ for vector products,
the expected first-best profit becomes
Πfb =
1
2
‖µ‖‖φ‖ cosκ, (7)
where κ is the angle between vectorµ and vectorφ, and ‖·‖ denotes the length of the respective
vector.
The agent’s task-specific abilities affect the expected first-best profit in two ways. The first
effect is a result of the overall cost intensity for implementing an arbitrary effort vector. To
illustrate this effect, consider two agents A and B characterized by ΨA and ΨB, respectively.
If ΨA = λΨB, λ > 1, agent A exhibits a less overall cost intensity than agent B for the
implementation of an arbitrary effort vector. Observe, however, that both agents share the same
relative task-specific abilities across tasks. Therefore, λ‖φA‖ = ‖φB‖, whereas κA = κB.
The second effect follows from the relation between the payoff sensitivities µ and the agent’s
relative task-specific abilities Ψ. Consider for instance the agent’s ability ψi to perform task
i. If this ability is increasing (i.e. ψi decreases) relative to the other abilities, the agent could
implement the same effort vector, but suffers less disutility of effort for performing task i. In
this case, ‖φ‖ increases. However, the effect on κ is ambiguous. Particularly, decreasing ψi
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leads to a higher angle κ if ψi < 1, and to a lower κ, otherwise. For the principal, however, it
is optimal to enhance efbi until the marginal benefit of task i is equal to its marginal costs, i.e.
µi = ψiei. Consequently, Πfb increases. This eventually implies that a potential decline in cosκ
is preponderated by an increase of ‖φ‖.
4 The Second-Best Contract
If the principal cannot directly contract over e, she faces an incentive problem for motivating the
agent to implement appropriate effort. Since the gross payoff V (e) is non-verifiable, the only
contractible information is the performance measure P (e). However, the application of P (e)
in an incentive contract may cause two inefficiencies. First, the performance measure—and
therefore the agent’s compensation—is uncertain such that the risk-averse agent requires a risk
premium for accepting a contract dependent on P (e). Second, the performance measure can be
incongruent and, therefore, motivate the agent to inefficiently allocate her effort across tasks.
The subsequent analysis focuses on the second inefficiency since the trade-off between incentive
risk and the agent’s desire for insurance is intensively analyzed by previous literature.10
In a second-best environment, the principal’s problem is to design a contract (α∗, β∗) that
maximizes her expected profit Π = E[V (e) − w(e)] while ensuring the agent’s participation.
The optimal linear contract therefore solves
max
α,β,e
Π ≡ µte− α− βωte (8)
s.t.
e = arg max
e˜
α + βωte˜− 1
2
e˜tΨe˜− ρ
2
β2σ2 (9)
α + βωte− 1
2
etΨe− ρ
2
β2σ2 ≥ 0, (10)
where (9) is the agent’s incentive condition and (10) her participation constraint.
First, observe that (9) can be replaced by e = Ψ−1ωβ. For the subsequent analysis, let
Γ ≡ Ψ−1ω = (ω1/ψ1, ..., ωn/ψn)t be the vector of measure-cost sensitivity ratios. Thus, the
agent implements
e∗ = Γβ. (11)
10For a detailed analysis in a LEN-setting, see e.g. Spremann [1987], Baker [1992], and Prendergast [1999];
and for a general approach Shavell [1979], Holmström [1979], Grossman and Hart [1983], and Rees [1985].
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In contrast to the first-best scenario, the agent’s effort ei for performing task i depends on the
measure-cost sensitivity ratio ωi/ψi and the incentive parameter β.
In order to maximize her expected profit, the principal sets α such that the agent’s partic-
ipation constraint is binding. By solving (10) for α and substituting the resulting expression
together with e∗ in the principal’s objective function (8), the maximization problem simplifies
to
max
β
Π ≡ µtΓβ − β
2
2
[
ωtΓ + ρσ2
]
. (12)
The first-derivative of Π with respect to β gives the optimal incentive parameter
β∗ =
µtΓ
ωtΓ + ρσ2
. (13)
Besides the precision of the performance measure, 1/σ2, with the agent’s risk tolerance, 1/ρ,
the optimal incentive parameter is a function of the gross payoff sensitivitiesµ, the performance
measure sensitivities ω, and the measure-cost sensitivity ratios Γ. Recall that Γ = Ψ−1ω, i.e.
Γ comprises the agent’s task-specific abilities Ψ. Hence, β∗ incorporates Ψ in two ways: (i)
by its relation to the gross payoff sensitivities µ in the numerator; and (ii), by its relation to
the performance measure sensitivities ω in the numerator and denominator. It can therefore be
inferred that agents with different task-specific abilities may obtain diverse incentive contracts,
even if they are in charge of performing an identical set of tasks and evaluated by the same
information system.
Substituting β∗ in (12) and using geometric representations give the principal’s expected
second-best profit
Π∗ =
‖µ‖2‖Γ‖2 cos2 θ
2(‖ω‖‖Γ‖ cos ξ + ρσ2) , (14)
where θ denotes the angle between the vector of payoff sensitivitiesµ and the vector of measure-
cost sensitivity ratios Γ. The angle between the vector of performance measure sensitivities ω
and vector Γ is denoted by ξ.
5 Performance Measure Congruity and Effort Distortion
In this section, I focus more intensively on performance measure congruity and its effect on
effort distortion if the agent performs different tasks with varying degrees of ease.
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Performance measure congruity refers to the degree of alignment between the agent’s marginal
effect on her performance measure and on the expected gross payoff [Feltham and Xie, 1994].
Performance measure congruity can thus be characterized by the angle ϕ between the vector
of payoff sensitivities µ and the vector of performance measure sensitivities ω, as emphasized
by Baker [2002]. In contrast, effort distortion refers to the relation between an implemented
effort vector e and the vector of the payoff sensitivities µ. If the agent’s effort allocation re-
flects its relative contribution to V (e), her effort is non-distorted, see definition 2. However, as
shown in section 3, effort distortion is not necessarily inefficient. Even the first-best effort is
distorted if the agent has comparative advantages in performing some tasks relative to others.
Nevertheless, a distorted effort allocation is inefficient if it deviates from the one implemented
under first-best. The agent implements an efficient (first-best) effort allocation if there exists a
constant λ > 0 satisfying efb = λe∗. Recall that efb = Ψ−1µ and e∗ = βΨ−1ω. This leads to
the first observation.
Corollary 1. Only a congruent performance measure with µ = λω, λ ∈ R∗, leads to a first-
best effort allocation. If in addition ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n, the second-best effort vector e∗ is
non-distorted.
Observe that the first part of this corollary is independent of the agent’s task-specific abili-
ties. Consequently, I achieve the same observation as Feltham and Xie [1994] even for a more
general setting with task-specific abilities. If the applied performance measure is incongruent,
we can infer that the agent is motivated to implement an inefficient effort allocation, regardless
of her characteristics. However, the extent of this inefficiency is determined by Ψ. Finally, iden-
tical task-specific abilities additionally lead to non-distorted effort if the applied performance
measure is congruent. The rationale for this observation is that identical abilities for performing
all relevant tasks imply that the agent’s preference for her effort allocation is only determined
by the relative contribution of her tasks to the performance measure. If this measure reflects the
agent’s relative contribution to firm value, i.e. it is congruent, she is motivated to implement
non-distorted effort.
As we know from previous literature, the principal can motivate the agent to implement any
desired effort intensity by providing an appropriate incentive parameter β. In contrast, the effort
allocation cannot be controlled by the principal, as long as the underlying information system
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generates only one performance measure. It can be deduced from previous observations that Γ
plays an important role for the induced effort allocation.
Proposition 1. If ψk 6= ψj for at least one pair (k, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}, k 6= j, then ΥD(θ) = cos θ
measures effort distortion under second-best.
Proof See appendix.
Note that the measure ΥD(θ) is negatively related to effort distortion. The less distorted
the agent’s effort allocation with respect to µ, the smaller is θ, and consequently, the higher is
ΥD(θ). If θ = 0, the application of performance measure P (e) motivates non-distorted effort.
Observe, however, that an incongruent performance measure induces non-distorted effort if
µ = λβΓ, λ ∈ R∗, or equivalently,
ω = Ψµ (λβ)−1 . (15)
In this case, the performance measure sensitivitiesω are a transformation of the agent’s marginal
contribution to gross payoff µ and her task-specific abilities Ψ. However, as pointed out by
corollary 1, a non-distorted effort allocation can only be optimal if P (e) is perfectly congruent
and the agent experiences identical abilities for performing all relevant tasks.
Suppose the available performance measure P (e) changes such that the agent is motivated
to implement a less distorted effort allocation. Formally, θ decreases. This implies, ceteris
paribus, a higher expected profit Π∗. Note, however, that there is a second effect on Π∗ captured
by ξ as the angle between ω and Γ. To illustrate this effect, we can re-formulate the agent’s
effort costs by substituting e∗:
C(·) = 1
2
β2‖ω‖‖Γ‖ cos ξ. (16)
The properties of the agent’s task-specific abilities affect her effort costs in two ways. The first
effect is a result of the effort cost intensity over all tasks. For illustrative purposes, assume that
the effort costs take the form C(e) = etλΨe/2 with λ > 0. Increasing λ implies that all tasks
become more costly to perform, thereby leading to a higher ‖Γ‖ without affecting cos ξ. The
second effect is caused by the relation between the performance measure sensitivities ω and the
agent’s task-specific abilities Ψ. The relative abilities across tasks thereby affect ‖Γ‖ and cos ξ.
Recall that ‖Γ‖ determines the effort intensity without affecting the allocation. In contrast, cos ξ
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Figure 1: Performance Measure Congruity and Effort Distortion for n = 3
measures the agent’s effort costs (in utility terms) for a particular effort allocation motivated by
P (e).
Corollary 2. If ψk 6= ψj for at least one pair (k, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}, k 6= j, then ΥM/C(ξ) = cos ξ
characterizes the measure-cost efficiency.
The previous results are illustrated in figure 1 for the three-dimensional case (n = 3). Be-
sides the second-best effort vector e∗, it depicts the vectors of the gross payoff sensitivities µ,
performance measure sensitivities ω, and measure-cost sensitivity ratios Γ. The effort vector
e∗ has the same direction as Γ, only their lengths differ, depending on β. Observe that e∗ is
not necessarily on the plane spanned by µ and ω. The location of e∗ relative to µ character-
izes the induced effort distortion (angle θ), whereas the relation between µ and ω measures
the congruity of performance measure P (e) (angle ϕ). Finally, the measure-cost efficiency is
characterized by the relation of Γ to ω (angle ξ).
If vector µ and vector ω point in the same direction, then efb = λe∗, λ > 0, i.e. the
incentive contract motivates the agent to implement the first-best effort allocation, see corollary
1. Nevertheless, inducing a first-best effort intensity by adjusting β can only be optimal if the
agent is either risk-neutral or the performance measure is perfectly precise. Otherwise, the
principal imposes to much incentive risk on the agent which requires the payment of a higher
risk premium to ensure her participation.
Now consider the case where the agent has identical abilities for all tasks, i.e. ψi = ψˆ > 0,
i = 1, ..., n. As a consequence, Γ = ω/ψˆ so that vector Γ and vector ω point in the same
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direction. This additionally implies that e∗ = ωβ/ψˆ and ξ = 0. Thus, e∗ and ω are identical
with respect to their direction, only their lengths differ, depending on β and ψˆ. Accordingly,
the measure of congruity is now identical to the measure of distortion. This observation is
summarized and proofed by the subsequent proposition.
Proposition 2. If ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n, then ΥD(ϕ) = ΥC(ϕ) = cosϕ.
Proof See appendix.
If agents do not exhibit different task-specific abilities, performance measure congruity and
effort distortion are captured by the same measure. However, if we allow the agent to possess
different abilities across tasks, it becomes pivotal to distinguish between both concepts. The ap-
plication of incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts leads to inefficient effort
allocations, but the extent of these inefficiencies are further determined by the agent’s relative
abilities for performing the relevant tasks.
Consider again the expected second-best profit Π∗ from section 4. According to the pre-
vious observations, it depends on three elements: (i) the measure of distortion ΥD(θ) in the
numerator; (ii) the measure-cost efficiency ΥM/C(ξ) in the denominator; and (iii), the agent’s
risk aversion ρ in conjunction with the variance σ2 of the applied performance measure in the
denominator. It is common knowledge that the trade-off between incentive risk and the agent’s
desire for insurance affects optimal incentive contracts. Moreover, as demonstrated by Feltham
and Xie [1994] and Baker [2002], incentive contracts in multi-task agency relations are adjusted
to the congruity of applied performance measures. However, the previous analysis indicates that
the measure-costs efficiency is a third crucial factor whenever the agent performs some tasks
more efficiently than others due to task-specific abilities.
6 Ranking Performance Measures
As Feltham and Xie [1994] emphasized, performance measures may differ with respect to their
congruity and precision. The previous analysis additionally indicates that task-specific abilities
play a crucial role for the contract efficiency. This section therefore focuses on how the attributes
of performance measures and agents eventually determine the relative value of measures in
multi-task agencies.
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Consider a set P of m ≥ 2 performance measures Pi(e) = ωtie+ εi, with Pi(e) ∈ P ⊆ Rm
and εi ∼ N(0, σ2i ).11 To illustrate the relative value of individual performance measures, we
can compare the expected profits each of them would induce if applied in the agent’s incentive
contract. Then, performance measure Pk(e) is referred to be strictly superior, if it provides the
principal a strictly higher expected profit than all other available measures Pi(e) ∈ P, i 6= k.
For single-task agency relations, Kim and Suh [1991] have shown that the value of per-
formance measures can be compared by their respective signal/noise ratio. Schnedler [2006]
generalized their signal/noise ratio to a setting, where the agent is in charge of conducting mul-
tiple tasks. By applying the formulation proposed by Schnedler [2006] (see Definition 2), the
signal/noise ratio of performance measures Pi(e) is
Λi =
(∇Pi(e∗))t (∇Pi(e∗))
σ2i
, (17)
where ∇Pi(e∗) is the gradient of performance measure Pi(e) with respect to e. In single-task
agencies, performance measures with higher signal/noise ratios provide more precise informa-
tion about the implemented effort and are therefore strictly preferred to measures with lower
ratios. In this multi-task setting, the signal/noise ratio of performance measures Pi(e) is
Λi =
‖ωi‖2
σ2i
. (18)
One can infer from the previous analysis that signal/noise ratios are not necessarily sufficient
to rank performance measures in multi-task agencies, especially, when agents differ in their
task-specific abilities.12 This deduction is supported by the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Performance measure Pk(e) is strictly superior to any other performance mea-
sure Pj(e) ∈ P, j 6= k, if and only if,
‖ωk‖
‖Γk‖
ΥM/C(ξk)
(ΥD(θk))2
+
ρσ2k
‖Γk‖2(ΥD(θk))2 <
‖ωj‖
‖Γj‖
ΥM/C(ξj)
(ΥD(θj))2
+
ρσ2j
‖Γj‖2(ΥD(θj))2 , (19)
where ΥD(θi) is the measure of distortion induced by Pi(e), and ΥM/C(ξi) is the related quan-
tification for the measure-cost efficiency, i = {j, k}.
11Subscript i refers henceforth to performance measure Pi(e) ∈ P.
12Schnedler [2006] comes to the same conclusion by analyzing a multi-task agency framework, where the agent
enjoys cost synergies across tasks.
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Proof Follows directly by rearranging Π∗(Pk(e)) > Π∗(Pj(e)) and substituting ΥM/C(ξi) =
cos ξi and ΥD(θi) = cos θi, i = k, j.
The value of a performance measure in comparison to any other measure is contingent
on two ratios: (i) the normalized ratio between the measure-cost efficiency ΥM/C(·) and the
induced effort distortion ΥD(·); and, (ii) the normalized inverse of the distortion measure ΥD(·)
with the precision 1/σ2k of the performance measure and the agent’s risk tolerance 1/ρ. Observe
finally that performance measure congruity does not directly enter into this ranking criteria.
It, however, affects indirectly the measure of effort distortion ΥD(θi) and the measure-cost
efficiency characterized by ΥM/C(ξi).
In fact, the value of performance measures in multi-task agencies cannot necessarily be
compared by their respective signal/noise ratios. It is rather pivotal to take the induced effort
distortion and measure-cost efficiency into consideration—both determined by the performance
measure sensitivities ωi relative to the agent’s task specific abilities Ψ. Therefore, comparing
the value of performance measures requires specific knowledge about the agent’s character-
istics, which is not necessary for ranking performance measures in single-task agencies. In
multi-task agencies, however, the agent’s characteristics eventually determine the principal’s
preference for a specific information system.
Corollary 3. Suppose ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n. Then, performance measure Pk(e) is strictly
superior to any other performance measure Pj(e) ∈ P, j 6= k, if and only if,
1
ΥC(ϕk)
[
1 + ψˆρΛ−1k
] 1
2
<
1
ΥC(ϕj)
[
1 + ψˆρΛ−1j
] 1
2
, (20)
where Λi, i = {j, k}, is the signal/noise ratio of performance measure Pi(e), and ΥC(ϕi) its
congruity measure.
Proof See appendix.
If the agent’s preference for an effort allocation depends only on the characteristics of her
performance evaluation since her abilities are identical for all tasks, we can use adjusted sig-
nal/noise ratios to rank performance measures in multi-task agencies. Nevertheless, it is still
required to know ψˆ and ρ in order to assess the relative value of performance measures.
The subsequent proposition offers a sufficient condition ensuring that performance measures
can be ranked exclusively by their respective signal/noise ratios, and therefore, independent of
the agent’s characteristics.
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Proposition 4. Suppose there exist constants λj 6= 0 satisfyingωi = λjωj for all i, j = 1, ...,m,
i 6= j. Then, performance measure Pk(e) is strictly superior to any other performance measure
Pj(e) ∈ P, j 6= k, if and only if, Λk > Λj .
Proof See appendix.
Accordingly, the signal/noise ratio is sufficient to rank performance measures in multi-task
agencies, if all measures provide the same information about the agent’s relative effort alloca-
tion. In this case, observe that ΥC(ϕi) = ΥC(ϕj), i, j = 1, ...,m, i.e. all performance mea-
sures share the same measure of congruity.13 As a consequence, every available performance
measure—if applied in the agent’s incentive contract—would imply the same effort distortion
and measure-cost efficiency. Then, their relative value is defined by their precision and scale,
which in turn is represented by their respective signal/noise ratio.
To investigate the effects of task-specific abilities on the ordering of performance measures,
it is insightful to eliminate effects related to their precision. By setting ρ = 0, condition (19)
simplifies to
ν
cos2 θk
cos2 θj
>
cos ξk
cos ξj
, ν =
‖ωj‖
‖ωk‖
‖Γk‖
‖Γj‖ . (21)
The value of performance measure Pk(e) relative to Pj(e) depends—besides on their precision
and scaling as previously emphasized—on their relative effort distortion (cos θi) and relative
measure-cost efficiency (cos ξi) weighted by the multiplier ν, i = k, j. In order to make both
measures comparable, it is essential to normalize their scale ‖ωi‖, and exclude their effect on
‖Γi‖, i = k, j. Accordingly, if either the agent is risk-neutral or the realization of performance
measures is not influenced by random effects, the relative value of performance measures de-
pends on two factors: (i) the motivated effort allocation and its contribution to gross payoff
V (e); and, (ii) the imposed costs to motivate this effort allocation.
7 Conclusion
Applying incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts motivates agents to imple-
ment an inefficient effort allocation across relevant tasks. This paper incorporates task-specific
13Note that the reversed inference cannot be made, i.e. if ΥC(ϕi) = ΥC(ϕj), it is not necessarily true that
ωi = λjωj , λj 6= 0, i, j = 1, ...,m, i 6= j. In this case, the signal/noise ratio is not sufficient to rank performance
measures in multi-task agencies.
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abilities in a multi-task agency framework and investigates their effects on the provision of in-
centives. As demonstrated, incentive contracts are tailored to the agent’s task-specific abilities
and, particularly, depend on three factors: (i) the inefficiency of effort distortion as a result of
applying incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts, relative to the agent’s task-
specific abilities (distortion effect), (ii) the agent’s effort costs associated with the motivated
effort allocation (measure-cost efficiency); and (iii), the precision of the information system
with the agent’s risk-aversion (risk effect).
This paper further proposes a ranking criteria for performance measures in multi-task agen-
cies. One important observation is that the signal/noise ratio, commonly used to assess perfor-
mance measures in single-task agencies, is not a sufficient ranking criteria in multi-task agen-
cies. The relative value of performance measures depends—besides on their precision—on
their congruity relative to the agent’s task-specific abilities, thereby implying that their ranking
is tied to the agent’s characteristics. Hence, we can infer that the selection of ‘suitable’ agents
for a given information system provides the principal some latitude to improve the contract
efficiency.
This paper is part of a larger research agenda. Previous multi-task literature focused pri-
marily on performance measure congruity and its effect on incentive contracts. As this paper
illustrates, we can shed more light on the nature of incentive contracts in multi-task agency
relations, when we keep in mind that agents may differ in their skills and abilities to perform
particular tasks.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Effort distortion refers to the relation of e∗ to µ and can be therefore measured by the vector
product µte∗. Since e∗ = Γβ,
µte = β
n∑
i=1
µiΓi = β‖µ‖‖Γ‖ cos θ. (22)
First note that ‖µ‖ does not affect the relative importance of tasks for V (e). Furthermore, β‖Γ‖
determines the lengths of vector e∗, but not its direction in the n-dimensional space. The length
is arbitrary in the sense that it can be adjusted by β. Consequently, ΥD(θ) = cos θ ∈ [0, 1]
measures the induced effort distortion under second-best.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
To measure effort distortion, we can use the vector product µte∗. If ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n,
then e∗ = βω/ψˆ. This leads to
µte =
β
ψˆ
n∑
i=1
µiωi =
β
ψˆ
‖µ‖‖ω‖ cosϕ. (23)
Again, ‖µ‖ does not affect the relative importance of tasks for V (e), and β‖ω‖ determines
the lengths of vector e∗ but not its direction in the n-dimensional space. Thus, Υ¯D(ϕ) =
cosϕ ∈ [0, 1] measures distortion under second-best if ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n. Consequently,
Υ¯D(ϕ) = ΥC(ϕ).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3.
If ψi = ψˆ > 0, i = 1, ..., n, then Γi = ωi/ψˆ and ‖Γi‖ = ‖ωi‖/ψˆ, i = {j, k}. Consequently,
ΥM/C(ξ = 0) = 1 and Υ¯D(ϕi) = ΥC(ϕi), see proposition 2. By substituting Λi = ‖ωi‖2/σ2i ,
i = {j, k}, the ranking criteria of proposition 3 can be reformulated to the one stated in the
corollary.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4.
Observe first that the expected profit on the basis of Pi(e) can be written as
Π∗ =
(µtΓi)
2
2(ωtiΓi + ρσ
2
i )
. (24)
Recall that Γi = Ψ−1ωi. Consequently, performance measure Pk(e) is strictly superior to any
other performance measure Pj(e) ∈ P, ∀j 6= k, if and only if,(
µtΨ−1ωk
)2
2(ωtkΨ
−1ωk + ρσ2k)
>
(
µtΨ−1ωj
)2
2(ωtjΨ
−1ωj + ρσ2j )
. (25)
If ωk = λωj , we can re-scale Pj(e) such that it is characterized by the same sensitivity in e as
Pk(e). Accordingly,
P¯j(e) = ω
t
je+
εj
λ
, (26)
where Var
[
P¯j(e)
]
= σ2jλ
−2. Let ω ≡ ωi, i = j, k. This leads to(
µtΨ−1ω
)2
2(ωtΨ−1ω + ρσ2k)
>
(
µtΨ−1ω
)2
2(ωtΨ−1ω + ρσ2jλ−2)
, (27)
which can be re-arranged to
1
σ2k
>
λ2
σ2j
. (28)
Recall that after re-scaling, ωk = ωj . Thus, (28) can be written as
‖ωk‖2
σ2k
>
λ2‖ωj‖2
σ2j
, (29)
which is identical to Λk > Λj .
Q.E.D.
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